On the analysis of hydrocarbon leaks in the Norwegian offshore industry by Vinnem, Jan-Erik
On the analysis of hydrocarbon leaks in the Norwegian offshore industryJan Erik Vinnem*
University of Stavanger/Preventor AS, Norwayore acc
, sever
ate the
. This
preve
try ha
study
prepaa b s t r a c t
There have been several major offsh
near-misses during the last ten years
these severe occurrences demonstr
involved in critical offshore operations
requirements in Norway are aimed at
been far from successful. The indus
involved in causing these leaks. This
the leaks, and that failures during the
conducted during night shift. The analysis gi
Abbreviations: CCR, Central Control Room; ESD,
Health and Safety Executive; MTO, Man, Technolo
Norwegian Continental Shelf; NTNU, Norwegian Uni
nology; PSA, Petroleum Safety Authority; RIF, Risk I
Permit.
* Tel.: þ47 51487880; fax: þ47 51487881.
E-mail address: jev@preventor.no.idents in different offshore regions since 2005. In Norway there have been several very serious
 al of which involving serious hydrocarbon leaks with catastrophic ﬁre and explosion potential. All
 importance of learning from major accident precursors in order to appraise the risk potential
 paper is based on analysis of about 175 hydro-carbon leaks in the period 2001-2010. Regulatory
 nting as far as possible such occurrences during night time, but the analysis shows that this has
 s for many years claimed that the maintenance personnel are the main group of employees
 has shown that leaks during the execution of maintenance and modiﬁcation are less than half of
 ration for carrying out maintenance tasks are more frequent. Such preparations have often been
ves a strong incentive to change this practice.1. Introduction
It has been demonstrated over the last ten years that personnel
involved in process system interventions are involved in the 
causation of more than half of the leaks (96 out of 175, see Fig. 2) 
from process plants of offshore installations in the Norwegian sector 
(Vinnem, Seljelid, Haugen, & Husebø, 2007). The leaks in question 
are those with escalation potential, and a mix of gas, condensate 
and crude oil leaks, see further details in Section 2. Competence, 
attitudes, motivation and other relevant factors would therefore 
inﬂuence the performance of interventions and the associated 
probability of leaks as well as the performance of Emergency 
Shutdown (ESD) valve maintenance. This is discussed in some 
depth by Vinnem, Hestad, Kvaløy, and Skogdalen (2010).
Major accidents are rare in offshore operations, the last major 
accident, at least with fatalities, in offshore operations on the 
Norwegian continental shelf occurred in 1985. Even precursor 
events are quite rare, typically in the order of one event per 
installation per year. It is therefore crucially important to maintainEmergency shutdown; HSE,
gy and Organisation; NCS,
versity of Science and Tech-
nﬂuencing Factor; WP, Workmotivation and awareness in order to prevent as far as possible the 
occurrence of such precursor events. The next precursor event may 
be the next major accident if the battery of mitigation barriers on 
offshore installations has a complete failure.
Major hazard precursor events can be many types of events, 
such as vessels on collision course, structural defect, temporary loss 
of well control as well as Okstad, Jersin, and Tinmannsvik (2012) 
has analyzed 25 accident and incident investigations, and has 
focused on causal factors. It is also pointed out that the investiga-
tion process should be improved. They also observe that with the 
exception of one case, the accident potential of the different acci-
dents was more comprehensive than actually occurred, but it 
should be noted that only 5 hydrocarbon leaks were included in the 
study of Okstad et al. (2012).
Thunem, Kaarstad, and Thunem (2009) has analyzed 20 inves-
tigation reports in the Norwegian petroleum industry, and has 
documented that the consideration of organizational factors in 
accident investigations is unsystematic due to lack of consensus 
and common understanding about which organizational aspects to 
consider. One weakness of Okstad et al. (2012) and Thunem et 
al.(2009) is that no distinction is made between occupational 
acci-dents and major accident precursors. This is discussed 
further in Section 5.1.
Kongsvik, Johnsen, and Sklet (2011) has explored the extent to 
which a safety climate measure from a survey on working condi-
tions used in an oil and gas company can be used as a leading 
and lagging indicator in relation to hydrocarbon leaks on 
offshore
Fig. 1. Hydrocarbon leaks on Norwegian continental shelf, 1996-2010 (n ¼ 357, PSA, 2011a).installations. It was found that the safety climate measure could 
serve as both a leading and lagging indicator for hydrocarbon leaks, 
based on the empirical evidence in the study.
SINTEF has on behalf of the Petroleum Safety Authority analyzed 
a selection of the leaks on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) in 
the period 2002e2009 (2011b), but has not used a work process 
model for the analysis of leaks. As a consequence, the different 
personnel groups are also not considered. Their conclusions are 
distinctly different from all other works on the causes of leaks 
(Haugen, Vinnem, & Seljelid, 2011; Sklet et al. (2010), in the 
sense that aspects associated with design are found to be the main 
cause category of hydrocarbon leaks.
When it comes to details of circumstances of such leaks, we ﬁnd 
only to a limited extent such information published. UK Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) has published annual reports on the 
hydrocarbon leaks reported from the UK offshore industry, but has 
not focused on work process modelling. Petroleum Safety Authority 
(PSA) [Norway] has also published annual statistics; see Fig. 1.
Edmondson (2004) has published a paper on the experience of 
HSE, and its campaign to reduce the number of leaks by 50%. 
Edmondson notes that causes are not associated with great tech-
nical complexity, but often failures in basic controls and proce-dures. 
This is in line with the ﬁndings previously by this author, and the 
main message of the present paper. The most recent study of leaks 
reported to HSE is Li (2011), which conﬁrms the previous analysis. 
Circumstances of the leaks in the Norwegian sector have been 
analyzed in some depth by Haugen et al. (2011) for the period 
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Fig. 2. Hydrocarbon leaks distributed on operationalA risk analysis model (Risk_OMT model) for detailed analysis of 
circumstances of hydrocarbon leaks have been developed by 
Vinnem et al. (2012), a discussion of the use of the model is 
provided by Gran et al. (2012).
The objective of the paper is to study details about the hydro-
carbon leaks from the investigations, in order to ﬁnd particularities 
about these precursors that may help to understand why it is a high 
frequency of leaks. The leaks are analyzed on the basis of the work 
process model developed by the Risk_OMT project. This is a theo-
retical model which has not been calibrated against operational 
experience. The present paper is the ﬁrst opportunity to present data 
for the parameters in the model. The present study gives a unique 
insight into detailed information about circumstances of leaks that 
have not been publically available before. The study is also unique 
with respect to the large amount of data that is avail-able, i.e. the 
number of leaks and the high percentage of investigations.
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the hydrocarbon leaks and 
associated trends. Chapter 3 presents an analysis of the leaks in a 
work process context, whereas Chapter 4 discusses the times at 
which the leaks occur. The ﬁndings are discussed in Chapter 5, 
followed by conclusions in Chapter 6.
2. Overview of major accident precursor events
The development of the number of leaks per year is documented
by Petroleum Safety Authority in the RNNP report (PSA, 2011a). 
Fig. 1 presents the overall trends in the period 1996e2010. TheTechnical degradation; 
9
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 circumstances, average 2001-2010 (n ¼ 175).
 
 
 lowest number was achieved in 2007, after which a stable, higher 
level has been reached in the period 2008e2010. In the spring of 
2011 PSA requested improved efforts by the industry in order to 
achieve further reduction.
The source of the data is PSA, but it is important to stress that 
the reports and investigations are submitted to PSA on a voluntary 
basis by the oil companies. PSA has permitted analysis of the data, 
with the proviso that the presentations shall be anonymous. All the 
raw data from the companies have therefore been available for the 
analysis. PSA has stated that they encourage analysis of the data, 
because none of the companies would be able to perform similar 
analysis, due to conﬁdentiality issues. It could be noted that the 
statistics is presented without normalization (such as per installa-tion 
years), as the number of producing installations is very stable from 
year to year after the year 2000.
The raw data has information about the type of hydrocarbon 
leaking in the various events. It should ﬁrst of all be emphasized that 
only ‘production ﬂuids’ are included in the statistics, i.e. petroleum 
products (after reﬁning) such as diesel, hydraulic oil, lube oil, etc. are 
not included. This is one of the main differences from the leak 
statistics published by HSE for the UK continental shelf 
(Edmondson, 2004; Li, 2011). The systems involved are process 
systems and ﬂowlines downstream of the christmas tree (excluding 
subsea wells) for production wells, including gas injec-tion and gas 
lift wells. With respect to type of media in the leaks, the following is 
the distribution for the period 2008e2010:
 Stabilized oil leak: 9 (21%) 
 Oil/gas leak: 3 (7%)
 Condensate leak: 2 (5%)   
 Gas leak: 29 (67%)
Two thirds are gas leaks, with stabilized oil as the second main 
category (21%), whereas oil/gas and condensate are seven and ﬁve 
percent. This could be compared to the distribution reported by Li 
(2011): Oile24%; ‘dual phase’e3%; condensatee4%; gase44%; non-
process liquids & othere25%. If non-process liquids and other are 
excluded, the values show that the leaks in UK are more oil leaks 
and correspondingly lower number of gas leaks. Li has argued that 
these percentages are to some extent dominated by the smallest 
leaks. Since these small leaks are not reported from the Norwegian 
sector, this may be the explanation of the difference.
Fig. 1 shows that the highest number of leaks occurred in year 
2000 and 2002, and that there were signiﬁcant reduction until 2007. 
The purpose of the paper is not to analyze in detail the reasons for 
the decrease in the number of leaks in this period. It should be noted 
however, that the industry’s association (OLF) formulated two 
campaigns for the periods 2003e05 and 2006e08, each with the 
target to reduce the 3 year average number of leaks to 50% of the 
value in the previous three year period. The targets were reached at 
the end of the ﬁrst period (in 2005) and in the middle year (in 2007) 
in the second period. Many experts believe that these reductions 
were caused by the high focus on prevention of leaks due to these 
two campaigns. There were no such campaigns earlier, and the new 
focus was probably a motivation factor for reduction of the number of 
leaks. Different actions were implemented at the same time in order 
to improve the quality of the work relating to interventions in the 
process systems, such as mandatory courses in bolt tightening. A 
common work permit system was also imple-mented during this 
period, and training courses were conducted in this regard.
When OLF did not continue the formal campaigns after 2008, 
this coincided with the increase of the number of leaks. Similar 
experience occurred in UK a few years earlier, where campaigns 
were not continued, the number of leaks increased again. A newcampaign has been formulated again in 2011, but it is too early to 
ﬁnd effects of the new campaign, which is running in the three year 
period 2011e13.
The development of the approach to main circumstances of the 
scenarios when the leaks occur on the installations has been 
document by Vinnem et al. (2007) and Haugen et al. (2011), and the 
annual trends are documented by PSA. Vinnem et al. (2007) and 
Haugen et al. (2011) have documented how latent errors have been 
introduced by different personnel groups involved in the planning, 
preparation or implementation of manual interventions. Latent errors 
may result from errors made during planning, if this results in a faulty 
instruction for the work, such as to open or close the wrong valve. 
Latent errors are errors that are introduced without being revealed, 
such as operating the wrong valve or leaving a valve in the wrong 
position, or tightening bolts in a ﬂange with insufﬁ-cient torque. When 
a line or section is pressurized, such as during reinstatement, an 
open valve may leak instantly, or a gasket may fail due to bolts with 
insufﬁcient torque. There are many examples of such leaks from the 
investigations. The classiﬁcation of leaks that has been used in 
these works has the following main categories (Vinnem et al., 2007):
 Technical degradation of system (Category A) 
 Human intervention
* introducing latent error (Category B)
* causing immediate release (Category C)  
 Process disturbance (Category D)
 Inherent design errors (Category E)
 External events (Category F)
If we split the data in the two ﬁve year periods, some changes in 
the distributions emerge, as shown in Fig. 2. The contribution from 
technical degradation has been halved in the period 2006e2010, 
also the contribution from process distributions is signiﬁcantly 
reduced. Design errors have increased, and the categories associ-
ated with human intervention, especially the latent errors (corre-
spondingly to ’delayed leaks’).
Work processes are deﬁned in procedures and will usually 
involve a long list of steps, at least for a complex maintenance or 
modiﬁcation task. For our analysis in this study we have structured 
the work process into four main steps:
1. Planning 2. Preparation
3. Execution 4. Reinstatement
The work process phases are further illustrated in Fig. 9. Plan-
ning involves long term and short term planning, including overall 
schedules, Safe Job Analysis, preparation of the isolation plan, etc. 
Preparation implies shut down, isolation and depressurization 
according to the isolation plan, etc. Execution is the completion of 
the task at hand, the opening of ﬂanges and connections, replace-
ments and the remaking of connections. Reinstatement is the 
resetting of valves and controls according to the isolation plan, as 
well as the leak testing and starting up.3. Work process classiﬁcation of leaks
Leaks on the Norwegian Continental Shelf were analyzed for the
period 2001e2005 in the BORA research project. This has been
reported in Vinnem et al. (2007) and Haugen et al. (2011) for the
period 2001e2005, which was the period with the highest number of
leaks in the Norwegian sector, as also demonstrated by Fig. 1. I t
Fig. 5. Distribution of leaks on work process phases, Norwegian Continental 
Shelf, 2001-10, n ¼ 51.
Fig. 3. Distribution of leaks on work process phases, Norwegian Continental 
Shelf, 2006-10, n ¼ 13.was therefore considered useful to repeat the analysis for the 
period 2006-2010.
The model used as basis for the analysis is the risk model 
developed in the Risk_OMT project, including the work process 
phases shown above in Section 2. The work process phases are 
also shown in Fig. 9.3.1. Leaks on NCS in period 2006-2010
The number of leaks on the Norwegian Continental Shelf in the 
period 2006-2010 is much lower than in the period 2001-2005, 68 
leaks in the last ﬁve years versus 125 leaks in the ﬁrst ﬁve years. 
The leaks that are included in the analysis are those that were 
associated with manual intervention in the systems (Categories B & 
C, see Section 2). With this ﬁlter, the number of leaks is 57 in the 
period 2001-2005, and 41 in the period 2006-2010.
Fig. 3 presents the distribution of work process phases were 
errors have occurred which were causes of the leaks. Only in 13 of 
the 41 leaks was there sufﬁcient extent of details available in order to 
allow the work process phases of the errors to be identiﬁed. In some 
of cases, errors were made in two work process phases.
Fig. 4 presents the distribution of personnel categories involved 
in the errors which were causes of the leaks. Only in 11 of the 41Fig. 4. Distribution of leaks on involved personnel groups, Norwegian Continental
Shelf, 2006e10, n ¼ 11.leaks was there sufﬁcient extent of details available in order to allow 
the personnel groups that were involved in the errors to be identiﬁed. 
In some of cases, errors were made by more than one personnel 
category.
The personnel groups used in Fig. 4, such as ‘Production tech-
nician’, CCR personnel and ‘Area technician’ do all belong to the 
production personnel group, ‘area technician’ may also be called 
‘production area responsible engineer’.
It may be observed from Figs. 3and 4 that the distributions do 
not depart extensively from the corresponding distributions for the 
period 2001-2005. This is discussed in more detail in Sections 5.5 
and 5.6.3.2. Aggregated data set
By combining the data set for 2006-2010 with data from 
previous studies, the most extensive data set may be arrived at. TheFig. 6. Distribution of leaks on involved personnel groups, Norwegian Continental
Shelf, 2001e10, n ¼ 49.
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Fig. 7. Relative fractions of shifts when the leaks occur, offshore production installation, Norwegian Continental Shelf, 2001-10, n ¼ 168.leaks considered here are those associated with manual interven-
tion, categories B & C, see Section 2. The resulting distributions are 
shown below in Figs. 5and 6. The work process phases were pre-
sented in Section 2.
Not surprisingly, the distributions in Figs. 5and 6 are similar to 
those presented for the individual periods; 2001e2005 and 
2006e2010. Preparation and execution are the two main phases. 
Personnel associated with production operations dominate clearly 
over maintenance personnel with respect to personnel groups 
involved in causing the leaks.4. Time of day when leaks occur
The time of the leak is known in virtually all of the leaks, this is
recorded in the reporting system for unwanted events. The analysis 
of what time the leaks occur is nevertheless not as straight forward 
as one might expect. It has been demonstrated (Chapter 2) that 
some of the leaks occur during manual intervention in such a 
manner that operational failures may introduce latent leak 
conditions, which unless detected in time, will lead to a leak when 
that particular section is pressurized.0
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Fig. 8. Hour of the day when leaks occur during day shift and night shift, offshoThe important time for these leaks is therefore not the time 
when the leak occurs, but when the latent error was introduced. 
The latter is however, not very often known from the investigations. 
As a rule, we have not been able to determine the time when the 
latent conditions were introduced in the process system, mainly 
only the time when the leaks occurred. For the leaks that occur due 
to latent errors, these times are of limited importance. It may on the 
other hand be relevant in relation to planning of how to start up a 
process section after maintenance or inspection.
The database in the current analysis consists of 174 hydrocarbon 
leaks on the Norwegian Continental Shelf that have been investi-
gated, all leaks exceeding 0.1 kg/s, which is the lower limit of leaks 
considered to have escalation potential (Vinnem, Aven, Husebø, 
Seljelid, & Tveit, 2006). The data are available from PSA’s 
Risk Level project (PSA, 2011b), and all the data are presented 
in an anonymous manner.
Sometimes it may be some uncertainty about whether the time of 
the leak detection is the time when the leak actually occurred. In 
general there is some anecdotal evidence about leaks that have 
continued for hours before detection. But the circumstances of the 
leaks analyzed in this paper imply that such delays are quite 
unlikely. The leaks have occurred in the process areas, where the16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
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Fig. 9. Illustration of main work process steps and classiﬁcation of leaks according to main elements of work process, Norwegian continental shelf, 2001-2010, n ¼ 49.coverage of automatic gas detectors is extensive. The leaks 
have been substantial, with initial leak rate at least 0.1 kg/s. This 
implies that gas detectors even at some meters range will be 
exposed to gas concentration within few seconds. The study is 
mainly based on accident investigation reports, where aspects 
relating to delays between occurrence and detection will be 
discussed. The delays that are considered in the investigation 
reports are limited to a few cases, and limited to short time, usually 
up to a couple of minutes, once up to about 15 min. The occurrence 
times that are discussed in this paper take such delays into account, 
and the occurrence times have been adjusted for such effects.
The same data are analyzed with respect to the time of the day 
when they occur. The time is unknown for a few cases, thus the 
time is known for 168 leaks. The dayshift is interpreted to be from 
0700 to 1900, at which time the night shift starts.
Fig. 7 shows that 44% of the leaks occurred during night shift, 
thus 56% during day shift. One of the main categories of circum-
stances when the leaks occur is manual intervention, according to 
Section 2, either as maintenance, inspection or modiﬁcation. These 
interventions may introduce latent errors, i.e. errors which will result 
in a leak when the particular part of the system is pressur-ized, or an 
immediate leak may be caused, for instance if the wrong valve is 
opened.
Fig. 7 also has information about the distribution between day 
and night shift for the leaks, when the latent errors are omitted 
from the database. The fraction of night shift leaks then increases to 
48.4% of the leaks during night shift.
The signiﬁcance of this is discussed later, but it may be brieﬂy 
mentioned that PSA Framework regulations (PSA, 2011a) proclaims 
that night work (between 24:00 and 07:00) is allowed if the risk on 
the installation is reduced by carrying out the work at night. It would 
be impossible to argue that having hydrocarbon leaks (which 
normally results in mustering of personnel to lifeboats)during night implies reduced risk, rather the contrary, because 
most people will be asleep. Furthermore, if evacuation becomes 
necessary, that will be more demanding and less safe during 
darkness. The high fraction of leaks during night is therefore an 
aspect which calls for improvement.
Fig. 8 presents the distribution of times when leaks occur at the 
hour of the day for all leaks. 42 of the leaks have occurred during 
the period 24:00 to 07:00, corresponding to 27%. This implies that 
that the percentage of leaks is roughly about the same percentage 
as of the hours included. Consequently, there is no evidence that 
hazardous work is avoided during the night hours, actually more 
the opposite, to some degree. Further details are presented in 
Vinnem (2012).5. Discussion of ﬁndings
5.1. Major hazard precursors versus occupational accidents
Most studies of accident or incident causes and circumstances 
rely on obtaining the largest possible sample size, it is therefore 
often considered useful to include as many accidents or incidents as 
possible. This may be one of the reasons why too often major 
hazard precursor events and occupational accidents are analyzed 
together. The present study is to some extent unique, as the number 
of major accident precursors is more than 170.
Another reason may be the failure to realize that there are 
extensive differences between accident causation between major 
hazard precursor events and occupational accidents. This does not 
necessarily imply that there are different root causes or Risk 
Inﬂuencing Factors (RIFs) involved, competence, training, motiva-
tion, awareness, culture, etc. are important RIFs in both types of 
events. But the risk controls, the possible actions to reduce risk, will
be signiﬁcantly different. Also the time sequences and the intervals 
may be very different.
Occupational accidents occur more frequently than even major 
accident precursors, which imply that feedback of experience is 
achieved regularly without too long delay. In the case of major 
accident precursors, there may be a long delay between actions that 
are taken and the feedback with respect to the effect of these 
actions. The research into accident investigations and the learning 
from investigations need to take this into account.
We therefore consider it essential to make clear distinctions 
between major accidents and occupational accidents for the anal-
ysis of circumstances and investigations and identiﬁcation of 
possible risk reduction actions. The present study is limited to major 
accident precursors only.
5.2. Robustness of ﬁndings
The objective of the work presented in this paper was to analyze 
in detail circumstances of hydrocarbon leaks on offshore installa-
tions in the Norwegian sector for the period 2006e2010. During this 
work it soon became clear that the data set for this period would be 
quite limited, such that it would be required to utilize also the data for 
the period 2001e2005, in order to have a sufﬁciently large data set.
For the analysis of the time of the day when leaks occur it is 
considered relevant to use data from the entire period 2001e2010, 
operational patterns and authority requirements have been mainly 
unchanged during the entire period, which should make data from 
the entire period applicable for this analysis. This implies that about 
170 leaks are applicable, almost 100 if the latent errors are excluded 
from the analysis. This is clearly sufﬁcient to make essential 
observations.
In spite of using all available company internal investigation 
reports, there are about a dozen leaks where all the variables could 
be identiﬁed from the available documentation for the period 
2006-2010. When the entire period 2001-2010 is used, we have 
about 50 precursor events (leaks) where all the variables could be 
identiﬁed from the available documentation, which is a reasonable 
data set. In order to make robust observations, this is the primary 
data set, but possible differences between the entire period and the 
last ﬁve years are addressed and discussed separately.
It is worth pointing out that the analytical approach here does not 
attempt to identify speciﬁc human errors that have been made nor 
RIFs that have been signiﬁcant contributors. The approach is limited 
to identiﬁcation of circumstances of the activities that have been 
carried out at the time of the leak. One of the advantages of such an 
approach is that there is quite limited uncertainty about the 
classiﬁcation.
5.3. Why is work process representation essential?
If we consider the investigations of some of the ‘famous’ process 
catastrophes during the last 20e25 years, such as Piper Alpha 
(Cullen, 1990), Longford (Hopkins, 2000), Texas City (CSB, 2007), 
Deepwater Horizon (Presidential Commission, 2011), it becomes 
very clear that the outcomes are mainly a result of a long event 
sequence, which has developed gradually for a signiﬁcant period, 
before it comes to a ‘point of no return’ where control is lost, and 
emergency preparedness has to take over. During the signiﬁcant 
‘build-up’ period (sometimes referred to as ‘spiral to disaster’), there 
are usually several opportunities where control might have been 
regained, if the awareness and understanding of the sequence of 
events had been sufﬁciently deep and thorough.
The same may be observed for some of the precursor events that 
have been extensively investigated, such as the oil leak in the utilityshaft (or column) on Statfjord Alpha (Statoil, 2008) and gas leak on 
Gullfaks Beta (Statoil, 2011).
These event sequences tie closely in with how the normal work 
on the plants/installations is carried out, this is certainly not limited to 
how a few safety critical tasks (as lifting heavy loads could 
exemplify) are carried out. It is therefore essential that the work 
processes are analyzed, because most of the maintenance and 
modiﬁcation tasks have work processes with durations over weeks 
and months.
Our observations from having conducted such studies over 
several years are that there is no viable alternative. There are so 
many important distinctions to be made between different stages of a 
work process and the different participants in these different stages, 
that it becomes meaningless to try to ﬁnd essential obser-vations if 
not considering the work processes.
It is therefore crucial to analyse the leaks in a work process 
perspective. A coarse illustration of a work process is shown in 
Fig. 9, which only shows the main steps in the work process and the 
involved groups of personnel. Very essential elements of the 
observations are missed when the leaks are analysed without the 
work process perspective. It is easy to make unrepresentative 
observations if the realistic perspective is missing from the analysis.
Fig. 9 demonstrates how the ’sharp end’, i.e. the mechanics 
carrying out the maintenance tasks are not responsible for the 
dominating contribution to leaks. This point is often missed when 
the work process representation is not used.
The diagram shows that planning personnel and operations 
responsible are involved in the planning activities, which contribute 
with 20% of the errors made. Executing personnel (mechanics, 
different trade technicians, etc), area (process) technician and CCR 
personnel are all involved in preparation, execution of maintenance 
and resetting, with respectively 33, 39 and 7% of the errors.
As far as we are aware, the main efforts by the industry over 
several years have been limited to actions that may reduce the 
number of leaks during the execution of the maintenance and 
inspection work. This is distinctly less than 50% of all the errors 
made, and may be one of the explanations why the efforts made by 
the industry has had limited effect.
5.4. Time of leak
The authority requirement to avoid operations that may cause 
increased risk is quite strong, and has been the same for several 
years. The analysis in this paper gives no documentation that this 
has any effect, the proportion of leaks during the prohibited period is 
about equal to the proportion of hours in that period as a fraction of 
24 h.
The ﬁndings with respect to shifts when the leaks occur show that 
the current industry practice in general is not in accordance with the 
regulations. One probable explanation is that the companies are not 
aware of the large proportion of leaks associated with preparation. 
The ﬁndings of this paper should be used by the industry to redeﬁne 
which tasks that may be carried out during night shift, or alternatively 
change how these tasks are carried out. There are at present far too 
many leaks that occur during night shift, especially in the prohibited 
period between 24:00 and 07:00. This is further discussed in 
(Vinnem, 2012).
The data basis for this part of the study is substantial, and it could 
not be argued that the ﬁndings in this part are particularly uncertain 
or unrepresentative.
5.5. Work process phases
The importance of representing the work process phases has 
already been discussed in Section 5.3. The available data is 
more
limited for this part of the study, and a thorough evaluation of the 
robustness of the ﬁndings is required.
The total number of leaks in the period 2001-2010 for the entire 
Norwegian sector is 175 leaks with ﬂowrate exceeding 0.1 kg/s. 
Leaks associated with manual intervention (categories B and C, see 
Section 2) are the primary focus in this analysis. The leaks in these 
two categories are fewer, 96 leaks in the period 2001-2010. In 
about half of these incidents are all the relevant details available.
When data from the two periods 2001-2005 and 2006-2010 
are compared, it can be observed that the general patterns are 
quite similar. These similarities imply obviously that also Fig. 5 will 
be quite similar. It can therefore be observed that even though the 
number of leaks is considerably lower in the period 2006-2010, the 
distribution of errors in the different work process phases is 
virtually unchanged.
With the close similarity between Figs. 3and 5, it is most 
representative to use Fig. 5 as the main message. Fig. 5 is based 
on 51 leak events, and has the most robust basis. The 
following approximate fraction may be observed from Fig. 5:
* Planning; one in ﬁve (20%)
* Preparation, one in three (33%)
* Execution, one in two and a half (40%) e 
* Reinstatement, one in fourteen (7%)
The distribution on work process phases is important for the 
industry to observe when identifying risk reduction actions. It has 
been a tradition that the main efforts have been directed at the 
execution phase and the mechanics that carry out most of the work 
in this phase. But at least 50% of the errors are made in other 
phases, most dominantly in the preparation phase, where the trade 
mechanics have a limited involvement.5.6. Involved personnel categories
There is an obvious correlation between work ﬂow phases and 
involved personnel groups. It has been assumed implicitly for a long 
time that maintenance and modiﬁcation personnel (mechanics) was 
virtually the only group involved in these precursor events. It is quite 
obvious from the present analysis that the picture is very different 
from this far too simplistic view.
With respect to the relationship between the two main groups, 
maintenance personnel and production personnel, Figs. 4 and 6 
show similar relationships. Fig. 6 is based on 49 events, and may 
be considered to have a robust basis. The following approximate 
fraction may be observed from Fig. 6:
* Area responsible, area technician, production technician; one
in two (50%)
* Maintenance personnel; one in three (31%)   
* Control room personnel; one in ten (10%)       
* Planning personnel; one in twelve (9%)
If area responsible, area technician, production technician and 
control room personnel are considered as one group (production 
personnel, usually oil company employees), their contribution is 
about twice as high as the contribution from maintenance and 
modiﬁcation personnel, whereas the common belief is that main-
tenance and modiﬁcation personnel (often contractor personnel) is 
virtually the sole group making these errors.
The sum of error cases in Fig. 6 is 70 corresponding to 49 
precursor events; this implies that the average number of errors per 
leak event is close to 1.5 errors per leak.6. Conclusions and recommendations
The paper has documented extensively why it is important that
analysis of hydrocarbon leaks as major hazard precursors should be 
based on a work process representation.
When a work process representation is chosen, there has to be a 
clear distinction between major hazard precursors and occupational 
accidents, because the work processes that are relevant for major 
hazard precursors do not cover at all the activities that may cause 
occupational accidents to occur and vice versa.
Night shift is not underrepresented in statistics of time of leak, in 
spite of Norwegian regulations prohibiting hazardous work 
between 24:00 and 07:00. This paper has documented a high 
number of hydrocarbon leaks during night shift, and in particular in 
the prohibited period 24:00 until 07:00. Even if only leaks associated 
with manual intervention (where the leak could have been avoided if 
the activity had not been performed during night shift) are 
considered, there is still a high number of leaks that occur in the 
prohibited period.
The paper has demonstrated that tasks relating to preparation for 
maintenance and modiﬁcation have more leaks during night shift 
compared to day shift. As far as what is known, it has been 
considered by the petroleum industry that preparation is virtually a 
hazard free activity. The paper has demonstrated clearly that this is 
not the case. Preparations for maintenance and modiﬁcations need 
to be banned completely by the oil industry on night shift, in order to 
operate in accordance with applicable Norwegian legislation.
From the point of preventing hydrocarbon leaks, the paper has 
shown that planning, preparation and reinstatement are more 
important than execution. Yet the industry has until now focused 
almost all its attention on the execution of maintenance and 
modiﬁcation tasks. As a consequence of this, the production 
personnel have twice the contribution as the contribution from 
maintenance and modiﬁcation personnel. The production personnel 
are mainly employees of the oil companies, rather than contractors 
who have often received more attention that what is justiﬁed by the 
results of the present analysis.
The paper has been based on access to investigations (or ’in 
depth’ studies similar to investigations), still the relevant details were 
only available in about half of the incidents, when leaks associated 
with human intervention are considered. It would have been more 
data available if the investigations had a stronger focus on 
identiﬁcation of work process phases where errors occurred and the 
type of errors and potential causes. It is known that the industry in 
2012 has started to focus on these aspects in internal reporting. 
Thus better data should hopefully be available in the future.
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